

# BOOK REVIEWS



***MIA Rescue: LRRPs in Cambodia.* By Kregg P.J. Jorgenson. Originally published by Paladin Press. Ivy Books, 1995. 247 Pages. \$5.99, Softbound.** Reviewed by Michael F. Dilley, Davidsonville, Maryland.

In May 1970, U.S. forces in Vietnam launched a 61-day "raid" into Cambodia as a continuation of fighting in enemy base areas along the border. The intent of this cross-border raid was to put the enemy on notice that he was not safe, even in a neutral country, and to eventually force Hanoi into meaningful peace negotiations.

Near the end of the incursion, on 17 June 1970, Team 5-2 of company H, 75th Rangers, was on a long-range reconnaissance patrol in Mondol Kiri Province, Cambodia. After radioing his night position, the patrol leader moved the Ranger team, unwittingly leading them into an ambush. This book is the story of the ambush, its aftermath, and efforts by Troop A, 1<sup>st</sup> Squadron, 9th Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division, to find and rescue the trapped Rangers.

Author Jorgenson, although a participant in the rescue mission, has written this book in the third person, which allows him more freedom to describe the actions of those involved, before, during, and after. Although he begins the book with the ambush, he fills in the background of the various soldiers involved—Rangers, pilots, Apache Blues, various commanders, and so on. He also explains the reasons for the Cambodian incursion as well as the reason it was doomed from the start to less success than it might have enjoyed—an end-date was fixed, allowing the enemy to lie low for a given period and just outwait the American forces.

This is an interesting, exciting story of war at the basic level—the individual soldier. Jorgenson conducted extensive interviews for this book and is able to tell us what the individual soldiers said, thought, heard, and felt and how they reacted. His style is clear and to the point. The reader follows the various soldiers through preparation, the chopper ride in, insertion, and actions on station. We share their hopes and fears, their elation and disappointment. In the end, we have a good understanding of

what builds unit cohesion and how it works in combat.

Jorgenson had another reason for telling this story. During the rescue operation, one of his squad members performed a particularly heroic act, but somehow the award recommendation was lost in channels and the soldier never received the award. When Jorgenson learned of this in the mid-1980s, he and other survivors from the operation who had witnessed the bravery began a campaign to correct the Army's oversight. On 17 October 1992, First Sergeant Francis A. Cortez was awarded the Silver Star for his valor in Cambodia in June 1970. Jorgenson intended this book to recognize Cortez for his gallantry in action and also to serve as a "collective award" for everyone else on the mission. He has achieved more than his stated goal in this book. I highly recommend it for all soldiers.

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***British Counterinsurgency in the Post-Imperial Era.* By Thomas R. Mockaitis. Manchester University Press, 1995. 165 Pages.** Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Harold E. Raugh, Jr., U.S. Army.

The British Army has participated in many "small wars," and as a result has developed a degree of proficiency in counterinsurgency operations that is arguably lacking in the U.S. Army, most notably during the Vietnam conflict.

Author Thomas R. Mockaitis, Assistant Professor of History at DePaul University, Chicago, first wrote about the uniquely British approach to internal war in *British Counterinsurgency, 1919-1960*. This current volume continues that study by chronicling and dissecting four "post-imperial" campaigns—the Indonesian "confrontation," South Arabia (Aden/Yemen), the Dhofar campaign in Oman, and Northern Ireland—which have taken place (or are still in progress) since 1960.

The first chapter describes the evolution of British defense policy and strategy after World War II. The economic decline, domestic concerns, and rising nationalism of those years made Britain realize its far-flung empire in Africa and Asia was no longer

tenable. The British had considerable experience—both successful and unsuccessful—in "imperial policing," but in this later period they had to refine their methods and expand their traditional "hearts-and-minds" campaign.

In each of the book's four case studies, the campaign is narrated and British tactics and techniques described and assessed. The "confrontation" was a hybrid conflict, combining counter-insurgency with conventional military operations, and in Oman, British officers planned and conducted a British-style campaign. Both of these campaigns were successful. In South Arabia and Northern Ireland, the insurgency took place in both urban and rural environments. The former campaign was "an unequivocal defeat," while the latter has continued with increasing ferocity since the introduction of regular troops into the fray in 1969. Other factors affecting the outcome of a counterinsurgency campaign include the availability of high technology and weapons, and the intensity of media coverage and its effect on public opinion.

In each of the book's four campaign studies, the British took the sound principles developed during their colonial wars and adapted them to the changing circumstances of the post-colonial era. Three broad policy principles—use of minimum force, civil-military cooperation, and tactical flexibility—highlight British counterinsurgency campaigns. This interesting and thought-provoking study of a timely topic is well worth reading.

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***Nelson A. Miles and the Twilight of the Frontier Army.* By Robert Wooster. University of Nebraska Press, 1993. 391 Pages. \$18.00.** Reviewed by Lieutenant Richard D. Starnes, U.S. Army Reserve.

In October 1861, Nelson Appleton Miles was appointed first lieutenant of the Twenty-second Massachusetts Infantry. Forty-two years later, he retired as the commanding general of the United States Army. Miles's career spanned what was arguably the greatest period of change in the history of both the United States and the U.S. Army. Rob-

ert Wooster's well-researched and well-written biography illuminates both the man and the times in which he lived.

Miles was born to a wealthy family in rural Massachusetts. Leaving home at 19, he moved to Boston and worked as a store clerk until 1861. Swept up by the war fervor, he borrowed money from relatives to organize and outfit a volunteer infantry company. Much to his disappointment, another man was given command of the company. Despite this early setback, this young officer was soon appointed aide-de-camp to Brigadier General O.O. Howard and within a year had assumed command of a regiment at the age of 23.

Often cited for his personal valor, Miles proved to be an excellent troop commander. He rose steadily through the ranks, ultimately serving as a division commander in the Army of the Potomac. After Appomattox, he was reduced to colonel and assumed command of Fort Monroe, where he was entrusted with the security of ex-Confederate president Jefferson Davis. In 1867 he was given command of a regiment of black troops, which was soon transferred to North Carolina to serve as occupation troops during Reconstruction. Miles later served as an agent of the Freedmen's Bureau but left the South in 1869 for Kansas, where another war was raging.

In an age when promotions were often linked to political connections, the blindly ambitious Miles was always concerned with cultivating relationships with powerful senior officers and elected officials. These connections allowed him to parlay battlefield victories into rapid promotions, something many officers could never accomplish. As a regimental commander on the western frontier, Miles fought bravely against the Sioux and Cheyenne, and captured two important Indian chiefs—Chief Joseph of the Nez Perce and Geronimo of the Apaches. He was rewarded with several important departmental commands and ultimately rose to the rank of lieutenant general. In his final post as commanding general of the United States Army, he helped plan U.S. military operations in Cuba during the Spanish-American War.

Although Miles had been a strong advocate of military modernization early in his career, by the 1890s he no longer seemed concerned with preparing the Army to fight future battles. He refused to consider the development of a general staff system or the establishment of a war college. In the last years of his career, his political connections disappeared. He fell from favor by criticiz-

ing Theodore Roosevelt's military policies and often clashed with Secretary of War Elihu Root over the administration of the Army. This once celebrated hero was forcibly retired in 1903.

Wooster's book is more than a biography of this important military leader. By placing Miles in proper context, Wooster gives readers excellent insight into western expansion, the internal strife of the post-Civil War Army, and events of the 19th century as seen by professional soldiers. Unbiased, indeed often critical of Miles, this admirable book will interest students of the Indian Wars, 19th century America, and American military thought.

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**Casualties and Consensus: The Historical Role of Casualties in Domestic Support for U.S. Military Operations.** By Eric V. Larson. Rand, 1996. 130 Pages. \$15.00, Softbound. Reviewed by Colonel George G. Eddy, U.S. Army, Retired.

In updating previous research on the role of casualties in domestic support for military operations, this study underscores that one of the key findings is the central role of leadership in determining domestic support. This would seem so obvious as to obviate the need for a new study. It also would appear to be clear that the number and trend of casualties in a military operation definitely influence public opinion to the extent that domestic support begins to erode if there is a basis for questioning the necessity of the engagement, especially if there is significant disagreement at the top levels of government and between the leadership of the political parties. Moreover, it would appear evident that the public's aversion to casualties is not new. And this is what the study confirms.

The author informs us that *detailed data, including public opinion and additional quantitative and qualitative data on political, military, and media activity were collected and analyzed for six different wars and military actions in which U.S. ground troops were employed: the Second World War; the Korean, Vietnam, and Gulf wars; Panama; and Somalia.* Further, he says that *the current effort involved the analysis of over a thousand public-opinion questions on military operations.* Again, one must ask why it took such an expenditure of time and effort to discover that the sun continues to rise in the east.

There was universal support for World War II because most Americans believed that our involvement was clearly vital to our

security interests, that once the war began there was considerable consensus by our leadership at the top levels, and that we should fight on to win despite the casualties. Support for Korea declined significantly after the Chinese entered the conflict and the war began to drag on without apparent satisfactory conclusions in sight as the casualties mounted. These two situations, though quite different in all particulars, seem obvious relative to the reasons for the type and degree of domestic support.

Then came Vietnam, where there evolved considerable disagreement among top leaders as to why we were there and what was to be accomplished, and as the conflict continued with escalating casualties without a valid resolution in view, the media began to publicize mass antiwar demonstrations to such an extent the President Lyndon Johnson decided to quit. The public began first to question and then finally to disbelieve what the administration and military leaders were putting out about "progress" and "success." Increasingly, the public began to despise the military for continuing to put Americans in harm's way without trying to win.

The Gulf War engendered considerable domestic support. The objective appeared valid and the extent of consensus by top civilian and military leaders was readily perceived. The public also appeared willing to accept thousands of U.S. casualties that fortunately did not occur, and the fighting's short duration precluded any substantial public disenchantment or unease, as was the case with the Panama operation. Not so with Somalia, for public discontent and criticism developed quickly as the public began to sense, as the objective for our presence became increasingly shrouded in confusion, that we did not know what we were doing.

Did we need a new study to reach these conclusions? Hardly.

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**The First: A Brief History of the 1st Infantry Division, World War II.** Cantigny First Division Foundation, 1996. (For sale by the First Division Museum, 1 South 151 Winfield Road, Wheaton, IL 60187-6097.) 102 Pages. \$8.00, Softbound. Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Albert N. Garland, U.S. Army, Retired.

The U.S. 1st Infantry Division is the oldest division in the Army and possesses a distinguished combat record. In particular, in World War II, it may have had the most distinguished record of any of our divisions. The division counted 443 days of combat

(89 in North Africa, 36 in Sicily, and 318 in northwest Europe) and suffered 21,023 battle casualties. Sixteen of its members were awarded the Medal of Honor (nine posthumously), while another 161 were awarded Distinguished Service Crosses.

At the end of the war in Europe, on 7 May 1945, the division was in Czechoslovakia. Many of its soldiers were eager to return home. At the same time, the division, which was to remain on occupation duty, began to receive numerous replacements.

The then-division commander, Major General Clift Andrus, directed that a small booklet be prepared that briefly outlined the division's role and its achievements during the war. He directed that each departing and arriving soldier receive a copy. The departing soldier would have something to show the folks back home what his unit had accomplished. The replacement's copy would serve to alert him to the division's outstanding wartime record and, hopefully, instill in him a sense of pride in having been part of the "Big Red One."

The original booklet has long been out of print. At the urging of retired Major General Albert H. Smith, Jr., a long-service 1st Division soldier, the division's museum decided to reprint the booklet as part of the division's commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the end of the war in Europe. General Smith went further: He prevailed on the museum staff to add to the original booklet a brief introduction and four addenda—including such things as the Medal of Honor citations and certain statistical information. The museum also added a four-color map, tipped-in at the back of the booklet, that traces the division's march to victory from Africa to Czechoslovakia.

General (and Mrs.) Smith and the museum staff are to be congratulated on a job well done.

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***Shrouds of Glory—From Atlanta to Nashville: The Last Great Campaign of the Civil War.* By Winston Groom. Simon and Schuster, 1995. 320 Pages. \$14.00.** Reviewed by Major Don Rightmyer, U.S. Air Force, Retired.

While General Ulysses Grant engaged Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia in the East from mid-1864 until the surrender at Appomattox in April 1865, General W.T. Sherman pursued the Confederate Army of Tennessee on his campaign for Atlanta and headed into Georgia's interior on the "march to the sea." This book's subject is the campaign for Atlanta launched

from Chattanooga in 1864. Instead of following Sherman's eastward advance after that city's capture, however, the author turns the story to follow the Army of Tennessee's northwestward march to battles at Franklin and Nashville, Tennessee.

The author of this book, Winston Groom, is well known for his best-selling novel *Forrest Gump*. This is his first venture into Civil War military history.

The reader finds that this book covers a longer time period than the subtitle promises. The author actually goes back to the Army of Tennessee's first major battle in the western theater at Shiloh to bring the story up to Sherman's drive against Atlanta. His major interest throughout the book seems to be Confederate General John Bell Hood, who by the time of the Atlanta campaign had suffered a wasted arm and lost a leg from wounds at Gettysburg and Chickamauga.

Following Joseph E. Johnston's continued retreat toward Atlanta under Sherman's pressure, Hood replaced Johnston and fruitlessly attempted to save the city. Instead of following Sherman's march to Savannah, however, Hood determined to head north into Tennessee and possibly even Kentucky.

Although the campaigns to Franklin and Nashville make interesting reading, this book overall is not well-done military history. Groom's description of the battle at Franklin is certainly a poignant account, as Hood orders his army to make a desperate frontal assault against massive entrenchments. The resulting casualties rank among the highest of the entire war.

Although a little disjointed in several places, *Shrouds of Glory* is enjoyable reading in most parts. The author's six-page note on sources at the book's end provides a valuable guide to personal accounts and worthwhile military histories of this campaign. That essay is a good start for any reader who wants to discover more about the latter half of the western campaign of the war.

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***G.I.: The American Soldier in World War II.* By Lee Kennett. University of Oklahoma Press, 1997. 265 Pages. \$16.95.** Reviewed by Ralph W. Widener, Jr., Dallas, Texas.

The author, a professor of history, emeritus, at the University of Georgia, states in the preface to the paperback edition that this book is an outgrowth of a preceding book—titled *For the Duration: A General Account of the Six Hectic Months After Pearl Harbor*

(Scribner's, 1987)—in which one chapter was devoted to the creation of the G.I. Army.

He calls this book "the story of a collective experience," saying that "it recounts an episode in the lives of several million American men whom fate—and its agent, the Selective Service System—called forth to fight in the greatest war in modern times."

Using military archives, contemporary newspaper and magazine accounts, memoirs, military letters home, interviews, and other material, Kennett provides the best account found in any book of what the Army was like for the new draftee—from the time he received his "Greetings" letter to the time he was inducted into the Army, trained for possible combat service, served overseas, saw combat, and was discharged at the end of the war.

In Chapter 1, the author prepares the reader for the "draftee's" military experience by relating the trauma surrounding the passage of the first military conscription act in the United States in peacetime. Known officially as the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, it was signed into law, by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, on 16 September 1940. But because the Congress didn't want to provoke mothers by taking young men who were still legally minors, the act limited the term of service to one year and authorized the Army to take a maximum of 900,000 men from the age group 21 to 35.

There was additional concern on the part of the Government over the way the nation's young men would take to the new military obligation. A Gallup poll of Americans between 16 and 24 years of age made it possible to gauge their feelings. For example, boys and young men were asked if they objected personally to a year of military service, and 76 percent said they did not. Many added, "If I'm likely to fight, I'd rather know how."

Because of the poll, everything went smoothly for the most part when the first nationwide registration took place on 16 October 1940. By that evening, Selective Service had the names and addresses of 16 million men. I was one of them.

Kennett's book focuses more on the draftee than on the regular soldier, and more on the Army than on any other service, probably because this is where most of the draftees ended up. The Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard preferred to recruit and were able to supply all of their manpower needs by that means through the end of 1942.

In the final chapter, the author recounts his experiences at the 40th reunion of the Railsplitters—the 84th Infantry Division—at Springfield, Illinois. He wrote: *I had come to the Railsplitters' reunion because I believed that what I saw and heard there would help me flesh out the story of the G.I. in the forty years since he returned from the war. The 84th proved to be a good choice. It was a "drafted division," one of those made up of Selective Service inductees from the outset.*

I got the feeling, reading this chapter, that the author wondered whether the "Railsplitters" worried about the country to which they were returning at the end of the war as much as some of the soldiers mentioned in this chapter said would be the case, and as much as the "experts" on the home front suggested.

But there was no real problem for them or for any other returning G.I.s. Coming home was easy for them, for in their hearts and minds they had never left. Staying in the Army was out of the question for the vast majority of them, and the foreign cultures they had encountered along the way were no match for the freedoms they had at home.

Whatever problems they may have thought were waiting for them were dispelled by the genuine welcome they received. And there would be no economic depression just because wartime factories were closing down. Few cars, refrigerators, and other durable goods had been produced during the war, and the returning G.I.s, as well as those at home, would need those goods for some time to come.

If the returning G.I. needed help, his government had a number of programs waiting for him to take advantage of: educational benefits, low-interest loans, medical care, and the "52-20 Club" (\$20 a week unemployment benefits for 52 weeks).

Anyone who has ever served during a period of war, whether drafted or not, will derive great pleasure from this book. And I believe that any age group today, including those in our colleges and secondary schools, will find it engrossing. I base this conclusion on the many such audiences I have spoken to about World War II during the past few years. I believe the exposure during the week-long television broadcasts preceding the 50th Anniversary of D-Day provided a positive interest in it that continues to this day.

**Telltale Heart: The Origins and Impact of the Vietnam Antiwar Movement.** By Adam Garfinkle. St. Martin's Press,

1995. 370 Pages. \$24.95. Reviewed by Dr. Joe P. Dunn, Converse College.

As I witnessed recently at a conference on the Vietnam War, the issue of the antiwar movement is as emotional today as it was during the war; and the old shibboleths and canards continue to dominate the debate. Both the former activists and those who hold them in contempt agree on the same myth—that the antiwar movement had a large effect on the outcome of the war. The activists claim that they brought the war to an end, and their adversaries assert that the activists were instrumental in stealing defeat from victory.

After a long list of exhaustive hagiographies on the antiwar movement, including those by Gitlin, Zaroulis and Sullivan, Wells, Anderson, Small, Halstead, Heineman, DeBenedetti and Chatfield, and many others, finally someone got the story right. Adam Garfinkle was not a supporter of the war, but he excoriates the shallowness of analysis by and about much of the so-called antiwar movement.

He makes three basic arguments:

- Instead of stopping the war, the antiwar movement prolonged it; but it was not a decisive factor in the war's outcome.
- The radicalism of the 1960s was not caused by the war but by the "generic difficulties of coping with the revolutionary social life of post-World War II America."
- The impact of the antiwar movement was not just in the past, because a remnant of the movement ensconced in academia and other places continues today to affect the way we view both history and present events. Obviously, each of these arguments is far more complex than it appears in brief synopsis, and Garfinkle develops each one, including several subtexts, in detail.

In all-too-brief summation of the author's basic premise, the U.S. lost in Vietnam because we employed sterile, inadequate, unimaginative military policy by civilian and military leaders; the U.S. wasn't outfought, it was outthought. In capsule, more brainpower was needed rather than more firepower. The antiwar movement contributed to Hanoi's morale but not to its victory. Garfinkle notes that the focus on the stereotype radicals is far too narrow. As other scholars also have pointed out, the so-called antiwar movement included liberals, conservatives, establishment figures, hardline civilian and military policymakers, intellectuals, hippies, and hardhats. The radicals attracted much attention and were lightning rods of anger then and now. But they had minimal impact on the war. They did, how-

ever, have deleterious effects upon standards in American culture and upon rational political discourse, and that legacy continues today.

## RECENT AND RECOMMENDED

**Getting the Message Through: A Branch History of the U.S. Army Signal Corps.** By Rebecca Robbins Raines. U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1996. (GPO S/N 008-029-00306-6.) 464 Pages. \$34.00, Hardcover.

**Guns of the Elite: Special Forces Firearms, 1940 to the Present.** By George Markham. Arms & Armour Press (distributed by Sterling Publishing), 1996. 176 Pages. \$22.95, Softbound.

**The Mighty Eighth in Art.** By Roger A. Freeman. Sterling Publishing, 1996. 160 Pages. \$39.95.

**Marine: A Guided Tour of a Marine Expeditionary Unit.** By Tom Clancy. Berkley, 1996. 336 Pages. \$16.00, Softbound.

**Colder than Hell: A Marine Rifle Company at Chosin Reservoir.** By Joseph R. Owen. Naval Institute Press, 1996. 272 Pages. \$29.95.

**The Gulf War and Mental Health: A Comprehensive Guide.** Edited by James A. Martin, Linette R. Sparacino, and Gregory Belenky. Praeger, 1996. 232 Pages. \$55.00.

**Fighting Proliferation: New Concerns for the Nineties.** Edited by Henry Sokolski. Air University Press, 1996. (For sale by Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington D.C. 20402.) 377 Pages.

**Psychological Operations: Principles and Case Studies.** Edited by Frank L. Goldstein. Air University Press, 1996. (For sale by Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.) 364 Pages.

**Bennett and the Pathfinders.** By John Maynard. Sterling Publishing, 1996. 249 Pages. \$24.95.

**Alien Wars: The Soviet Union's Aggressions Against the World, 1919 to 1989.** By Gen. Oleg Sarin and Col. Lev Dvoretzky. Presidio, 1996. 272 Pages. \$24.95.

**Managing "Command and Control" in the Persian Gulf War.** By Mark D. Mandeles, Thomas C. Hone, and Sanford S. Terry. Praeger, 1996. 192 Pages. \$55.00.

**War in the Air: True Accounts of the 20th Century's Most Dramatic Air Battles—by the Men Who Fought Them.** By Stephen Coonts. Pocket Books, 1996. 331 Pages. \$24.00, Hardcover.

**Samurai Warfare.** By Dr. Stephen Turnbull. Arms & Armour (distributed by Sterling Publishing), 1996. 160 Pages. \$29.95.

**Easy Target: The Long, Strange Trip of a Scout Pilot in Vietnam.** By Tom Smith. Presidio, 1996. 288 Pages. \$24.95.

**American Army Doctrine for the Post-Cold War.** By John L. Romjue. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (Fort Monroe, VA 23651-500), 1996. 159 Pages.

**Belonging to the Army: Camp Followers and Community during the American Revolution.** By Holly A. Mayer. University of South Carolina Press, 1996. 307 Pages. \$39.95. Coast Guard Helicopters.